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              NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
10-4302 
________ 
 
 
MACKIN ENGINEERING COMPANY, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY; AMERICAN EXPRESS 
TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, INC.;  
AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, FSB 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01041) 
District Judge:  Hon. Arthur J. Schwab 
________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 14, 2011) 
________ 
 
 
OPINION 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Mackin Engineering Co. appeals from the order of the District Court granting the 
motion to dismiss filed by American Express Co., American Express Travel Related 
Services Co., Inc., and American Express Bank, FSB (collectively, “American Express”) 
for failure to state a claim.  In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.” or “Code”) displaced Mackin’s common law claim 
that American Express breached implied duties in its corporate credit card contract with 
Mackin.  Viewing the U.C.C. as controlling, the Court held that Mackin’s claim was 
time-barred under the Code’s three year statute of limitations.  We will affirm.1 
I. 
Mackin, a Pennsylvania corporation, long maintained an American Express 
Business Credit Card Account, subject to a written Cardmember Agreement.  On or about 
July 21, 2006, Mackin discovered that one of its employees had been embezzling 
Mackin’s funds by “sign[ing] and issu[ing]” Mackin’s checks to pay for charges to the 
employee’s personal American Express credit card.  App. at 28.  Mackin uncovered 
evidence of the embezzlement on August 18, 2006, when one of its checks, dated June 
14, 2006, was misapplied to the employee’s personal account instead to Mackin’s 
business account.  Upon request, American Express credited $28,160.07 to Mackin’s 
credit card account, the amount of the misappropriated check.  Further investigation by 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction by virtue of the diversity of the parties under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
3 
 
Mackin revealed that the employee’s embezzlement spanned the previous three years and 
totaled $843,958.84, excluding the $28,160.07 credit.  Mackin immediately fired the 
employee.   
Approximately four years later, on August 6, 2010, Mackin filed a Complaint 
against American Express, alleging that the written Cardmember Agreement for the 
Mackin business account imposed duties on American Express to act in good faith and 
engage in fair dealing in its performance relating to that account, and also imposed a duty 
under the doctrine of implied necessity not to use Mackin’s funds to pay for the 
employee’s personal charges.  The Complaint further alleged that under the U.C.C., 
American Express had a duty to use ordinary care with respect to negotiating Mackin’s 
checks and crediting them to the employee’s personal account, and that American 
Express was “unjustly enriched by its conversion as payee” of the checks.  App. at 32. 
The Complaint states that American Express breached the contract and violated its 
implied duties, essentially by neglecting to “investigate” and “detect” the employee’s 
spending habits and use of Mackin’s funds for her personal credit card and by failing to 
“report” the employee’s conduct to Mackin.  App. at 33.  Mackin requested judgment 
against American Express in the amount of $843,958.84, the unrecovered amount of the 
employee’s embezzlement.   
After removing the case to federal court, American Express filed a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  In granting that motion, the District Court observed 
that Mackin’s breach of contract claim was “based entirely on allegedly misappropriated 
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company checks that were transmitted to and received by [American Express] in 
discharge of the debt owed by [Mackin]’s former [employee].”  Mackin Eng’g Co. v. Am. 
Express Co., No. 10-cv-1041, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108395, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 
2010).  The Court reasoned that Mackin’s common law claim was preempted by the 
U.C.C. because the Code provided Mackin “the remedy [Mackin] seeks for the action it 
is bringing against American Express – reimbursement of the negotiated sums.”  Id. at 
*16.  Moreover, enforcing the U.C.C.’s statute of limitations furthered the Code’s goals 
by recognizing that “the victim of the conversion is in the best position to detect the loss 
and take appropriate action.”  Id.  
Viewing the U.C.C. as having displaced Mackin’s claim, the District Court 
explained that Mackin’s Complaint, filed August 6, 2010, was not brought within the 
Code’s applicable three year statute of limitations, which began to run when American 
Express accepted Mackin’s June 14, 2006 check and credited it to the employee’s 
personal credit card account.  The Court thus dismissed the Complaint as time-barred.  
Mackin appeals.
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II. 
                                              
2
 We conduct a plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.  Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Although a statute of limitations defense generally cannot be raised in the 
context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made “where the complaint 
facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense 
clearly appears on the face of the pleading.”  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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In assessing whether the U.C.C. displaces a common law claim, this court begins 
with two basic principles.  New Jersey Bank v. Bradford Sec. Operations, Inc., 690 F.2d 
339, 345 (3d Cir. 1982).  First, the U.C.C. “must be liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1103(a); see 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1a-103(1).
3
   Second, “[u]nless displaced by the particular 
provisions of [the U.C.C.], the principles of law and equity . . . supplement its 
provisions.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1103(b); see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1a-103(2).  
Thus, the U.C.C. does not displace the common law “except insofar as reliance on the 
common law would thwart the purposes of the Code.”4  New Jersey Bank, 690 F.2d at 
346.  Where the U.C.C. “provide[s] a comprehensive remedy for parties to a transaction, 
a common-law action will be barred.”  Id. 
A fair reading of the Complaint reveals that Mackin’s claim is based entirely on 
American Express’s allegedly improper negotiation of Mackin’s unauthorized checks.   
The U.C.C. contains comprehensive provisions regulating negotiable instruments.  13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3102; Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-102.  Those U.C.C. provisions contain 
                                              
3
 Although Mackin argues that Pennsylvania law governs this action, and the position of 
American Express is that Utah law applies pursuant to a choice of law provision in the  
Cardmember Agreement (which is not in the record), both parties agree that their 
difference on that issue is irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal because both 
Pennsylvania and Utah have adopted the U.C.C.   
 
4
 The purposes and policies of the U.C.C. are  “to simplify, clarify and modernize the law 
governing commercial transactions;” “to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;” and “to make uniform the 
law among the various jurisdictions.”  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1103(a); see Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-1a-103(1).   
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a loss-allocation scheme that limits an employer’s ability to externalize the costs of 
employee embezzlement, reflecting the view that the employer is in the best position to 
detect the loss and take appropriate action.  Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“Article 3 of the UCC furnishes us with the applicable loss-allocation rules 
for the check payments.  These rules, premised on the responsibility to exercise ordinary 
care, proceed from the principle that liability rests with the party best able to prevent the 
loss.”); see 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3307, 3417, 3418, 3420, 4406; Utah Code Ann. §§ 
70A-3-307; 70A-3-417, 70A-3-418, 70A-3-420, 70A-4-406.   
Contrary to the policy underlying the U.C.C.’s loss-allocation scheme, Mackin’s 
common law breach of contract claim attempts to burden American Express, as payee, 
with an implied duty to investigate the conduct of Mackin’s employee.  Because this 
would thwart the policy reflected in the Code, the District Court correctly concluded that 
the U.C.C. displaced Mackin’s claim, rendering it subject to the Code’s applicable three 
year statute of limitations.  See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3118(g); Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-3-118(7).  As the District Court observed, Mackin “was clearly in a better position 
to detect its employee’s fraud more easily and quickly than American Express” and “had 
the opportunity to initiate this lawsuit within the statute of limitations after it discovered 
the entirety of its employee’s conversion in 2006, but chose not to do so.”  Mackin Eng’g 
Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108395, at *16.  Mackin does not dispute that under the 
applicable limitation period, the face of its Complaint reveals that its claim is time-
barred.   
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
